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A B S T R A C T 
Countries across the globe have formed regional integration schemes for many 
reasons. Liberalization of trade, greater negotiating power in the world arena, and the 
acceleration of industrialization are only a few of the many objectives of integration 
processes. Using the literature in a number of disciplines, this paper first looks at why 
economic, political and social integration is an attractive goal for the Andean countries: 
Colombia, Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. This paper analyzes the 
formation of the Andean Pact and uses it as a basis to determine if economic regional 
integration is beneficial to developing countries. The closed-economic policies of the 
individual member countries in the Pact as well as the Pact from 1969 to 1989 resulted in 
economic stagnation. After 1989, the member states reorganized the Pact into the 
Andean Communi ty (ANCOM) and abandoned many of their closed-economic policies. 
This paper looks at the new goals of A N C O M as well as the extent to which they are 
being realized. Finally, a hypothesis on possible courses of action is brought up. By 
using the Andean Communi ty as evidence, this paper concludes that developing countries 
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Supranational organizations have been growing in importance in both 
international economics and politics over the last half century. Among these 
organizations are economic integration schemes which have emerged in notable 
quantities. Integration schemes are agreements among certain countries to work together 
towards mutual ly improving their economies. These agreements are usually aimed at 
liberalizing trade and harmonizing economic policies. Although the most well-known 
and arguably most successful integration scheme is the European Union, there have been 
a number of schemes in the world. The most notable unions have been agreements 
between industrially developed countries, but there have been a number of integration 
attempts among developing countries that are worth discussing. 
Integration schemes between developing countries often have many differences in 
comparison with those of developed countries. Generally, the main objective of 
developed countries is reducing inefficiencies in existing domestic industrial structures 
by allowing an increase in international market competition. This opens up new markets 
for producers while helping the consumer obtain products more cheaply. Developing 
countries, on the other hand, usually have little or no industrial base. Since an attempt to 
improve inefficiencies in a non-existent sector would be redundant, governments of these 
countries tend to have goals aimed at manipulating rapid industrialization. Rather than 
work towards regional integration, many developing countries use import substitution or 
encourage foreign investment to try to close the gap between themselves and the 
developed world. This paper analyzes a specific area in the world where various 
strategies have been implemented to bring economic prosperity to the region. Since their 
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independence, the Andean countries of South America - Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, 
Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile - have depended on the exportation of agricultural products 
and raw materials. There is an apparent lack of industrialization and these economies 
historically have depended heavily on imported manufactured goods from the U.S. and 
Europe. As a result, a general fear emerged that unless some action was taken, their 
standard of living would continue to lag behind that of the developed world. 
Starting in 1969, the Andean countries began the integration process and formed 
the Andean Pact. Economists and political scientists have debated over whether the 
formation of integration schemes is beneficial to these countries. In one side of the 
debate realists argue against economic integration. According to realists, any economic 
gains that can be achieved through participation in economic unions are offset by the 
potential loss of sovereignty and increase in economic vulnerability. Liberals, on the 
other hand, support cooperative efforts between countries aimed at economic 
improvement. This paper takes a more liberal view by focusing on mutual economic and 
political gains of the Communi ty through integration rather than the loss of national 
sovereignty. 
The Andean Pact of 1969 favored a closed-economic policy in which member 
countries maintained some individual tariff structures and economic policies. As a result, 
their economies stagnated in the 1980s and the integration process was halted for a 
number of years. The reorganization of the Pact in 1989 into the Andean Community 
effectively changed the closed-economic policy into an open economic policy. The intra-
Andean tariffs were torn down and economic policy was coordinated. This paper 
analyzes the results of the closed-policy in comparison with the results of the open-policy 
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and determines to what degree economic integration is beneficial to the Andean 
Countries. Using the Andean Communi ty as a model, this paper will give evidence 
proving that schemes of integration can be economically and politically beneficial to 
more than to the developed world only. Regional integration in the developing world can 
be economically and politically beneficial to the member countries. This paper also 
hypothesizes that in order for regional integration to succeed the member countries 
should abandon import substitution and other closed-economic policies, encourage 
foreign investment, and create a single market. 
Chapter One looks at the costs and benefits of free trade areas, common markets, 
and economic unions in comparison with import substitution. Also, these are looked at in 
terms of costs and benefits specifically for the Andean Countries. Chapter Two examines 
the formation of the Andean Pact in 1969 and its strategic policies. Answers are given for 
why the Pact floundered from 1983 to 1989. Chapter Three analyzes the reorganization 
of the Pact and the creation of the Andean Community. It outlines the organization's new 
objectives and policies and explains reasons for its success. The conclusion hypothesizes 
the future economic and political prospects of the Community and examines the 




W H Y INTEGRATION? 
As the world continues to become increasingly integrated economically, 
politically, and technologically, politicians and economists debate whether the ultimate 
effects of integration will be positive or negative. The two camps that take the lead in 
this argument are realists and liberals. Realism is a theory that focuses on power politics, 
in which force or threat is the primary method states use to further their interests (Genest, 
2004: 42). Realists acknowledge that the nation-state has the responsibility to provide for 
its own defense and security. Thus, realists tend to be more wary of economic integration 
than liberals because the interdependence that comes from economic integration gives 
other states power over the nation-state's prosperity. Because the other state has no 
responsibility to defend or protect its neighbor state, realists see this sharing of power as 
hazardous. Realists tend to argue in favor of protectionalism, which is a tactic aimed at 
closing the economy from the outside world. Unlike realists, liberals point out that states 
cooperate as much as, if not more than, they compete (Genest, 2004: 124). "States 
cooperate because it is in their common interest to do so, and prosperity and stability in 
the international system are the direct result of that cooperation (Genest, 2004: 124). 
Liberals usually push to open up trade and economic cooperation between countries. 
Studies have shown that the more open an economy is to trade with the outside world, the 
better is the growth performance relative to others. For example, a study, Warcziarg and 
Welsh (2003), of 133 countries between 1950 and 1988 demonstrated that countries that 
liberalized their trade regimes enjoyed higher annual growths rates after liberalization 
(International Monetary Fund, 2005: 93). With this in mind, this paper does not argue in 
favor of one theory over the other overall. This paper does, however, support a liberal 
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argument for economic integration because there is evidence that suggests economies 
perform better when they open up and cooperated with the outside world, as this paper 
will show by analyzing the Andean Community. 
Countries often promote economic integration through integration schemes. 
Economic Integration schemes are agreements between countries to liberalize trade 
between themselves and harmonize economic policies in order to create a single market. 
In order to understand the costs and benefits of integration, one must understand the 
importance the market places in economics. In short, the word market is the place in the 
commercial world where forces of demand and supply operate and where buyers and 
sellers interact to trade goods, services, contracts or instruments, for money or barter. For 
the sake of this paper, two main markets will be looked at: the market on a domestic level 
and the market on an international level. 
The domestic market includes commercial activity within a nation-state. 
Production, consumption, and intra-national trade all fall under the category of the 
domestic economy. Governments may choose to manipulate their domestic markets by 
either encouraging or discouraging the competit ive process. Countries that pursue a 
decentralized competitive system, or a market-oriented policy, will seek to promote 
competition and the growth of private enterprise. They tend to abolish most regulations 
domestic agents or foreigners have imposed and are more like to support open-economic 
policies (Ghellinck, 1988 : 57-58). 
Other countries pursue an interventionalist perspective in which industrial policy 
is seen as a means used by the public authorities to channel industrial activity in the 
framework of a general economic program towards a number of pre-established 
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objectives. The means employed to achieve this are many and can be coercive in nature. 
Systems of quotas, rationing, or imposed prices are ways to influence production and 
consumption. Subsidies, allowances, or relief from taxation are also used. In more 
extreme cases the state may also influence economic activity by directly taking on 
productive activities, whether in collaboration with the private sector or alone (Ghellinck, 
1988: 59). The key difference between an interventionalist policy and a market-oriented 
policy is that while both governments may manipulate the economy, one under a market-
oriented structure will do so only to maintain a free market while a government following 
an interventionalist view will manipulate the economy for reasons other than maintaining 
a free market. Countries that follow interventionalistic policies tend to close their 
economies. 
The market on the international level is very different from the domestic market. 
First of all, the factors that impede free trade on an international level are multiplied in 
comparison to those that impede the domestic market. Costs in transportation, 
communication, and mobility of people have a detrimental impact on international trade 
(Morawetz, 1974: 14). On top of the tangible difficulties, foreign trade also is hindered 
by state intervention. Tariffs, non-tariff barriers, subsidies to domestic producers, and 
political disputes all generate hindrances on trade. To overcome these obstacles, states 
have collaborated to create supranational organizations among member countries 
designed to eliminate or manipulate these factors for the benefit of such member 
countries. These collaboration attempts are known as economic integration schemes. 
There are a number of types of integration schemes: 
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Free Trade Area - An agreement among participating countries in which tariffs 
and quantitative restrictions are abolished, but each country retains its own tariff against 
nonmembers . In theory, a free trade area is designed to increase trade between the 
member countries and give domestic industries the ability to sell their goods to a larger 
market (Group, 1974: 1). 
Customs Union - A free trade area that adopts a common external tariff against 
nonmember countries. In custom unions, the member countries harmonize their tariff 
structures against third countries. The main benefit of a customs union is that it prevents 
foreign companies or countries from infiltrating the free trade zone by exporting goods to 
the country with the lower tariff rates and then filtering these goods throughout the 
remaining countries without being subject to their tariff walls. Unions are also used to 
control importation and protect growing industries (Group, 1974: 1). 
Common Market - A customs union in which restrictions on factor movements 
are abolished. Resources, people, and capital are able to flow easily between member 
countries in a common market (Group, 1974: 1). 
Economic Union - A common market with some degree of harmonization of 
national economic policies. The Andean Communi ty best fits into this category. There is 
some degree of harmonization of economic policies in the Community. However, there is 
still some debate about whether or not the Communi ty meets the qualifications of a 
common market (Adkisson, 2003: 374). 
Total Economic Integration - All monetary, fiscal, and countercyclical policies are 
unified, which presupposes the establishment of a supranational authority whose 
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decisions are binding on the member states (Group, 1974: 1). The European Union is an 
example of near total economic integration. 
Each level of economic integration intensifies the amount of interdependence 
between the member countries. As interdependence grows, policy makers in these 
countries must first analyze the specific costs and benefits. 
Economic Benefits 
According to liberals, the economic benefits that can be accrued from forming an 
integration scheme vary depending on the economic situations of the individual member 
countries. For example, smaller countries can benefit by having a greater market to 
export products to without being hindered by tariffs. In the case of the Andean Pact, from 
1969 to 1975 Colombia had maintained an increasing trade surplus in intraregional 
commerce. In 1975 it peaked around $153 million (Fontaine, 1977: 36). Because of the 
existence of a free trade zone in the Andean Pact, Colombian companies were able to 
export products to a greater market that otherwise would not have been available to them. 
In 1973, the population of Colombia was 23.7 million. The total population of the 
member countries of the Andean Pact was 72.6 million (Fontaine, 1977: 65). By 
increasing the consumer population by almost 50 million people, companies have a 
significant growth potential. Both before and during the formation of the Pact, the 
Andean countries relied primarily on import substitution. Import substitution is a 
government strategy that calls for replacement of import materials with domestic 
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materials to encourage local production, stimulate innovation, and increase national self-
reliance in critical areas such as technology, manufacturing and food (Grabowski, 2010: 
104-116). The main problem of import substitution is that it is less effective in the case 
of smaller countries. In a small or medium country, producers are hindered because of 
the limited consumer population in the given country. Having access to a larger market 
can be equally beneficial for consumers as it is for producers. The larger the market the 
greater the competition and, theoretically, prices will drop. Consumers can buy goods at 
lower prices. For this reason, both Bolivia and Peru had agricultural policies that favored 
the consumer rather than the producer in the early 1970s (Londono: 1988: 39). 
"The wide consensus among economists is that free trade generates aggregate 
welfare gains through efficient reallocation of resources and production, reduction of 
prices, and exposure to foreign competition. In aggregate terms, economies that open 
benefit from doing so ." (Cho-Diaz, 2011: 379) This is true in the case of the European 
Economic Community (now the European Union). "With the removal of [customs, 
duties, and quotas] the general level of productive efficiency would rise because the 
inefficient producers would be faced with competit ion from more efficient outsiders." 
(Wengel, 1980: 16) To an extent this can be true in the Andean case. "The region's 
population would allow manufacturers to take advantage of economies of scale . . . and 
competition would prod entrepreneurs into a more efficient use of land, labor, and capital 
which would also make regionally produced goods more competitive in world 
markets."(Fontaine, 1977: 12) However, the elimination of industrial inefficiencies 
would not be a suitable objective. This is due to the fact that there has historically been 
limited industrial production in these areas (Morawetz, 1974: 4). In fact, the Andean 
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Economies rely principally on raw material exports, such as mining, agriculture, and 
petroleum. In 1969 alone, the Andean countries produced 906.7 thousand tons of copper, 
185.6 thousand tons of lead, 391.7 thousand tons of zinc, 229.8 million cubic meters of 
crude oil, 30.1 thousand tons of tin. This accounts for 9 1 % of the continent 's copper 
output, 8 8 % of tin output, 56% of zinc, 4 4 % of lead, and 80% of oil. Compare that with 
Brazil, one of the three economic giants of Latin America. Brazil had an output of 4.3 
thousand tons of copper, 22.2 thousand tons of lead, negligible amounts of zinc, 1.6 
thousand tons of tin, and 10.2 million cubic meters of crude oil (Morawetz, 1974: 2). The 
Andean countries today still have a strong mining economy. Peru mines 1 5 % of the 
world 's bismuth, 14 .5% of the world 's tin, 14% of the world 's silver, 11%> of the world's 
zinc, and 7.5%o of the world 's gold (ISA April 2011 Country Report, 2011). Colombia is 
the world 's fourth largest coffee producer and Ecuador is the world 's third largest banana 
producer (ISA April 2011 Country Report, 2011). 
Even though the Andean Countries—Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Bolivia—have large reserves of raw materials, heavy industry has lagged far behind that 
of other countries. In 1970, the Andean manufacturing sector lagged behind even that of 
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico individually in metallurgy, machinery, and equipment 
(Morawetz, 1974: 4). One of the most obvious potential benefits for the Andean 
countries is the possibility of industrial development. Individual countries often seek to 
improve their domestic industrial output by pursuing a closed economic policy. A closed 
economic policy encourages an autarkic system, in which a country becomes more self-
sufficient and independent. Through the use of imposing higher tariffs, quotas, or non 
tariff barriers (NTBs), a state can effectively discourage imports. This creates import 
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substitution and decreases the supply of the targeted product from foreign producers, thus 
creating a larger demand for the commodity and thereby encouraging the development of 
domestic production of the commodity. Before the creation of the Andean Pact, the 
tariffs of the Andean nations were high. "The unweighted average nominal tariff in 
Bolivia [was] 54 percent, in Colombia [was] 70 percent, in Peru 90 percent, in Ecuador 
106 percent, and in Chile it [was] 172 percent. . . There were even a number of higher 
tariffs on particular items: Ecuador 291 percent (beverages), Colombia 183 percent 
(clothing, shoes), Chile 388 percent (beverages) and even tariffs ranging up to 1,008 
percent on some chemical products in Chi le" (Morawetz, 1974: 31). As a result of a 
greater acceptance of open-economic trade policies in recent years in Latin America, 
Andean tariffs have dropped significantly. The average Colombian and Ecuadorian tariff 
dropped to around 15% by 1995 while Chilean and Venezuelan tariffs dropped to around 
12% (International Monetary Fund, 2005). 
A closed economic strategy has been a method used by a number of countries to 
boost domestic production. For example, to allow the young American farmers and 
manufacturers the ability to compete with the "dumping" strategy of British companies in 
American ports, Congress placed tariffs on British products. The advantage American 
producers of 1810 had over Andean producers in 1970 is that American producers 
enjoyed a larger consumer market. Not only was there a demand for these products in the 
United States, American farmers sold much of their produce to European consumers. 
Puyana estimated that in order for there to be a strong enough demand for manufactured 
products, there must be significant populations with yearly incomes constantly above 
$1,500 (according to 1980 levels of inflation) (Puyana, 1988: 73). In the cases of 
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Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, each had a large enough home market to assure it at least 
moderate rates of economic growth in the 1960s (Fontaine, 1977: 11). Because of a lack 
of consumer demand, import substitution failed to encourage rapid industrialization in the 
Andean countries before the formation of the Pact. 
As mentioned above, forming a common market in which tariffs and quotas are 
eliminated among a group of member countries can create a larger market to sustain a 
sufficient level of demand for industrial products to ensure industrial growth and can also 
allow the member countries to maintain protective policies against third countries. The 
forerunner of the Andean Pact was the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) 
created in 1960. It included all the countries that make up Latin America. The main 
hindrance that LAFTA spawned was the growing concern the smaller member countries 
had about their inability to compete with the larger countries in the area: Brazil, 
Argentina, and Mexico (Wengel, 1980: 5). These countries felt that they were not 
receiving adequate benefits from the Association and were "running the risk of becoming 
markets for the industrial surplus of the 'b ig th ree ' " (Wionczek , 1970: 60). A more 
exclusive common market was more practical for the Andean countries. 
Economic Costs 
According to a realist perspective, there are two main costs associated with the 
formation of economic unions. The first of these is the loss of national macroeconomic 
policy autonomy (Reeve, 1993: 31). In most economic unions, countries must adapt their 
current economic policy in order to harmonize with the other member countries. "All 
integration schemes must sooner or later face the question of the degree to which member 
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countries should harmonize their economic policies" (Morawetz, 1974: 25). In order to 
avoid disparities in economic growth, those policies concerning tariffs, export subsidies, 
indirect taxes, exchange rates, planning and macro stabilization, foreign capital, intra-
union factor movements , and currency unification must all be coordinated (Morawetz, 
1974: 25). Economic integration requires national governments to lend some of their 
decision-making power to the group of member nations that make up the bloc. 
Realists argue against integration because the state's ability to control its own 
economy is constrained in this process (Reeve, 1993: 36). "It is difficult if not 
impossible for a nation to maintain an open economy and, at the same time, pursue 
policies that significantly vary from the world." (Bryant, 1987: 93) In the case of a 
formation of a customs union where a common external tariff is formed to limit trade 
with third countries while opening up trade between member states, this will happen but 
only on a regional level. 
The stag hunt scenario in Game Theory can be used to describe the risks 
individual countries take during the integration process. Like this scenario, countries that 
are involved in customs unions must have faith that the others will not "cheat" and pursue 
their own national interests at the expense of the union. Ultimately, states are free to 
make their own decisions even when they group together in economic unions. There is a 
possibility that a member country will decide to pursue its own economic goals at the 
expense of the union. An example of this occurred in Chile in 1974 after Pinochet 's 
military government ousted President Allende. The new regime chose to undergo some 
major policy changes in order to help reconstruct the economy. "Economic and political 
leaders were convinced that foreign investment [would have] to play a large part in the 
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country's recovery." (Fontaine, 1977: 21) The new Chilean policy that favored an 
increase in foreign investment that repudiated much of the Andean Pact 's policy defined 
in Decision 24 on foreign investment. As much as the initiative proved to be invaluable 
to Chile 's economy, the consequences it faced in the Pact were severe. In reaction to 
Chile 's new approach, the other A N C O M members threatened to expel Chile from the 
Pact and attempted to persuade Pinochet to modify the law. In the end, Chile was forced 
to withdraw from the Pact. 
To prevent cheating, economic unions can intensify the coordination of policies to 
the point where the union becomes a system of total economic integration in which there 
is the creation of a supranational authority that can override the authority of the 
individual member governments to some degree. "Confronted by a tendency to 
generalize national protectionism which could cause the disintegration of the European 
Communi ty and in the absence of a political consensus on a coherent and specific 
European Industrial policy, officials of the Communi ty are led to adopt a policy based on 
selective, supranationally supervised and negotiated agreements." (Ghellinck, 1988: 68) 
However, realists again would argue against supra-nationality because it further restricts 
the ability of the nation state to govern itself and protect its own interest (Genest, 2004: 
44). 
There are m a n y external factors that increase risk. While domestic markets are 
often unpredictable at t imes, the international market is even more unstable. Economic 
interdependence increases a state's vulnerability to other member states (Genest, 2004: 
158). Growth in one state can spill over and have positive effects in other states. On the 
other hand, events such as market crashes, natural disasters, and political upheaval in one 
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member country in a union will negatively affect the economies of the other members. 
The U.S. stock market crash of 1987 was an example of how the new integrated markets 
transmit shocks throughout the world with speed and force (Krugman, 1991: 101). Also, 
the Greek financial crisis in 2010 showed how one damaged economy in an economic 
union could threaten the economies of the remainder of the member countries. Even 
rumors of a threat in another country can have detrimental effects on other member 
countries due to technological innovations over the past 50 years. "Technology allows 
information (and panic) to be instantaneously transmitted around the world. Technology 
also allows massive quantities of funds to move quickly in response to that information." 
(Spero, 1988-89: 114; Bryant, 1987: 110) 
Economics in South America have historically been subject to the destructive 
effects of political upheavals and natural disasters over the past century. In its first 146 
years of independence Bolivia has undergone 184 changes of government (Morawetz, 
1974: 6). Drug cartels, along with FARC rebels have hindered Colombia 's economy and 
have deterred potential foreign investment opportunities (ISA April 2011 Country 
Report). Only months after the creation of the Andean Pact in 1969, Peru underwent a 
military coup that removed Peru from the democratic column and installed in place of it a 
military dictatorship (Fontaine, 1977: 30). Even after democracy was more or less 
restored, the country was torn by civil war between the military and the Shining Path 
rebel group in the 1980s. Ecuador has had a series of coups from 1997 to 2006 and 
recently the government nationalized many private and U.S.-owned companies. In 2010, 
rebellious police forces held President Rafael Correa hostage for ten hours in response to 
dissatisfaction over a new civil service law (Freedom House, 2010). Although Venezuela 
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has maintained a working democracy from 1960, the most recent regime under President 
Chavez has denied the country of freedom of press and has placed restrictions on many 
former basic rights (Freedom House, 2010). Also, the Venezuelan government has 
nationalized much of the economy and reversed many of its older economic policies 
("Venezuela's Oil-dependent Economy: Socialism on the Never-never"). All these 
external factors prove to be a major road block for the integration process. 
Poli t ical Benefits 
The majority of benefits to be gained from forming an integration scheme are 
economic in nature but there are a few potential political benefits as well. Some 
countries use the opportunity to exercise leadership with their neighbors. For example, 
one of the reasons Venezuela participated in the Andean Pact was the position it had to 
"exercise leadership in Latin America and the Third World" (Fouts, 1975: 550). In the 
European Union, Germany has found it now carries a leadership role in Europe and the 
United States plays a leading role in NAFTA. Leader nations in economic unions have 
an advantage in negotiating power with other nations in the world. For instance, other 
countries will take them more seriously when they know they have the power to influence 
the economic policy of half a dozen other states. 
Economic Unions often participate with a single voice in negotiations in the 
FTAA. In 1998, the Andean Communi ty participated as one voice in FTAA and won 3 
out of the 9 chairs of the negotiating groups ("Who Are We?- Andean Community -
CAN.") . By participating as a single voice, the member countries gain a substantial 
amount of political leverage in the international arena. 
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Some of the benefits from an increase in trade between member countries are 
shown to have positive effects on political relations between those countries. As trade 
and integration rises between two or more countries, each country has more motivation to 
help ensure future prosperity in the other countries. Because of the interdependent 
relationship, prosperity in one country also means prosperity in the other (Genest, 2004: 
158). In the case of the Andean Community, one of the most strained relationships in the 
region is that between Peru and Ecuador. Both countries claim the El Oro region in the 
Amazon Basin. In 1942 Peru invaded and controlled all of the disputed area. The armed 
forces of both countries have fought a number of border skirmishes in the El Oro region 
of the Amazon River Basin, the most recent being in 1995. The countries ' commitment 
to economic integration was one of the leading factors that led prevented the skirmish 
from escalating into a full-scale war (ISA April 2011 Country Reports). 
Poli t ical Costs 
While countries involved in economic unions lose economic autonomy they also 
lose political autonomy. This is especially true for smaller countries. According to a 
concern known as symmetry, the economies of weaker countries can easily become so 
dependent upon those of larger countries in a trading situation that the weaker country 
loses political power to the more independent country (Genest, 2004: 159). The weaker 
countries must often align certain policies with those of the other countries. In economic 
unions, member countries must decide how to harmonize tariff barriers, exchange rate 
policies, and inflation rate policies in order to match those of other members (Morawetz, 
1974: 25). If they fail to do this, they could face repercussions from the other members. 
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In a system of total economic integration where a supranational entity overrules domestic 
policy, national governments are limited on how they can regulate and manipulate their 
economy. Also, an individual government may be pressured by other member countries 
to change foreign policy towards a third party. In 2005, for example, the Venezuelan 
government pushed Colombia and other A N C O M members to minimize political 
negotiations with the United States. President Chavez of Venezuela criticized Colombia 
for accepting U.S. military aid in fighting drug lords and FARC rebels. He later rebuked 
the Colombian President for announcing his intent to establish a free trade agreement 
with the U.S. Colombia was in a difficult position because its two largest trading partners 
were the U.S. , a destination for 3 9 % of Colombian exports, and Venezuela, a destination 
for 12%o of Colombian exports in 2005 (CIA - The World Fact Book). Colombia decided 
its trade with the U.S. was too valuable to sacrifice, so the government commenced 
negotiations with Washington. The Venezuelan retaliation was harsh. Venezuela froze 
trade with Colombia and withdrew from the Andean Community. ("Venezuela and 
Colombia: Politics versus Trade | The Economist"). From cases similar to the one 
previously mentioned, it is apparent economics often define politics. 
On the surface the creation of economic unions or common markets are purely 
economic, but there are many hidden political agendas that countries have for forming 
them. It is interesting to note that the Andean Pact was founded by political leaders, not 
economic or financial experts. "Frei of Chile, Belaunde of Peru, LI eras of Colombia, and 
Leoni of Venezuela were civilians and democrats, dedicated to social change by peaceful, 
orderly means" (Fontaine, 1977: 29). Bolivia and Ecuador at the time would shortly be 
joined by Peru in being led by military dictators who "insisted on making their own kind 
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of revolution—radical, authoritarian, anti-American—with a splendid disregard for basic 
economics" (Fontaine, 1977: 30). Politics and economics are interdependent upon each 
other. Without a stable political environment, an economic union will flounder. On the 




SUCCESSES A N D SETBACKS OF THE A N D E A N PACT 
This section is devoted to the assessment of the Andean Pact, which was created 
in M a y of 1969. The Pact was formally created in 1969 with the signing of the Cartagena 
Agreement . The Agreement was signed by the leaders of Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Chile. Venezuela joined the Pact four years later (Fontaine, 1977: 13). The 
Pact remained in force until 1989, when the member countries modified the goals and 
structure of the Pact to create the Andean Community. The reasons behind the initial 
successes of the Pact will be analyzed. A theory on why the Pact floundered in the 1980s 
will be brought up and discussed. 
C a r t a g e n a A g r e e m e n t : Ins t i tu t ions a n d Object ives 
The Cartagena Agreement was a reaction to the frustration of the Latin American 
Free Trade Association (LAFTA). According to the point of view of the smaller and 
medium economies that would soon form the Andean Pact, mainly the bigger economies 
of Mexico, Brazil and Argentina benefited from LAFTA (Penaherrera, 1988: 174). The 
limited free trade area formed in the association was beginning to transform the smaller 
countries into nothing more than markets for the big three. The countries of Peru, 
Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador "felt that they were getting few if any 
benefits from the integration scheme" (Wengel, 1980: 5). 
Another problem that frustrated the Association was the fear of these same 
smaller countries that they did not have enough bargaining power in LAFTA to check the 
individual ambitions of the "big three". In 1996, representatives from Chile, Colombia, 
Venezuela, Ecuador and Peru met in Bogota and issued the Declaration of Bogota. In this 
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meeting, these countries endorsed the creation of a subregional integration scheme within 
LAFTA (Fontaine, 1977: 13). This led to the creation of the Cartagena Agreement three 
years later. 
Initially, one of the main purposes of the Agreement was to create an entity that 
could effectively bargain with the larger members of LAFTA (Wengel, 1980: 6). At the 
time, its combined population of 72.7 million was larger than that of Mexico and 
Argentina but smaller than that of Brazil and had 2 5 % of the total population of Latin 
America. It soon became apparent that the subregion would act independently from the 
Association and its activities would far surpass the expectation of being merely a 
bargaining chip. The principal reason for the Pact 's formation was to "protect small and 
medium-sized South American republics from their large neighbors" (Fontaine, 1977: 
60). For this reason, it was designed to grow into a strong economic union. There were 
two ultimate goals for the Pact: to promote rapid industrial and economic development 
among its members (Fontaine, 1977: 14) and to encourage equal growth among member 
countries. 
In order to promote economic growth, the Pact decided to alter the tariff structure 
in its countries. Tariffs between themselves would be torn down so the area would 
effectively become a free trade zone. Tariffs would also be raised up against third parties 
and eventually a common external tariff would be established. "All the member 
countries of the Andean Group joined the Pact in the hope that the enlarged market 
demand would lead both to faster growth in the industrial sector and to the establishing of 
industries which would have been impossible to contemplate previously, given the size of 
the individual markets ." (Puyana, 1988: 74) 
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Harmonization of economic policy between the member states was required to 
achieve these ambitions. Without harmonization of economic policy, multinational 
corporations would have a window to exploit the free trade area by slipping in through 
the country with the lowest tariff barriers. Not only would a free trade zone be 
established, but the nations would be required to harmonize their tariffs with third 
countries. Morawetz stated "the greater the differences in pre-union tariff structures, the 
greater the need for adoption of a common external tariff after trade is freed. If the 
countries ' prior tariff structures are identical, harmonization is not necessary." 
(Morawetz, 1974: 30) The reason for harmonization is to keep foreign imports out of the 
Pact to encourage domestic import substitution. For instance, if country A and B are both 
in a free trade zone and country A has high tariffs with third country C while country B 
has a low tariff with country C, imports from C can still arrive cheaply in A via country 
B. The signers of the Pact felt that the establishment of a common external tariff was 
necessary if a common market was to be created (Angarita, 1988: 143). 
Another main objective decided upon in the Agreement was to foster balanced 
economic growth among its members . The terms of the Pact would not allow the 
appearance of unequal growth where the bigger economies would dominate the weaker 
economies (Morawetz, 1974: 73). It called for the "more highly developed countries to 
voluntarily give up part of the industrial growth which would otherwise be concentrated 
in their area" (Puyana, 1988: 75). By allowing the weaker members of the Pact certain 
benefits, the Group hoped to accomplish this. 
One of the benefits that were granted to the weaker members was the promise of 
industrial growth in their domestic economies. The Cartagena Agreement outlined a 
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centralized plan to manipulate production in the weaker countries. In an ideal common 
market where "only labor and capital costs are taken into account, and assuming that the 
poorer areas have lower real wages . . . than their richer neighbors, new industry, and 
especially new labor intensive industry, should initially tend to locate in the less 
developed areas of the union." (Morawetz, 1974: 75) An economic process similar to 
osmosis occurs in which industry leaves the richer countries and settles in the poorer 
countries and the standards of living among union members are equalized. 
A major problem, however, in the Andean Pact was that the benefits of lower 
wages and capital costs acquired in the poorer countries were often offset by poor 
infrastructure, a lack of skilled labor necessary for efficient modern industrial production, 
and poor financial and banking services (Morawetz, 1974: 75). The poor transportation 
and communication networks of the Andean countries make mobili ty and integration 
difficult because of high costs in travel. There were few railroads in the Andes in the 
1960s and many of the principal roads were unpaved (Morawetz, 1974: 9). 
The drafters of the Cartagena Agreement were aware of these obstacles and 
prepared to make "the most ambitious attempt at central direction ever attempted by any 
transnational communi ty" (Fontaine, 1977: 17) previously. Article 1 of the Agreement 
states: 
"The objectives of the present Agreement are to promote the balanced and 
harmonic development of the member countries, accelerate their growth 
by means of economic integration, facilitate their participation in the 
integration scheme established by the Treaty of Montevideo and establish 
favorable conditions for the conversion of LAFTA to a common market: 
all this with the purpose of procuring a lasting improvement in the level of 
living of the people of the subregion." (Morawetz, 1974: 73) 
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In short, the tools proposed in the Agreement for the fulfillment of the objectives 
of the Common Market were: 
oThe harmonization of social and economic policies. 
oJoint industrial planning. 
o A program of trade liberalization. 
oThe establishment of a min imum common external tariff to be 
subsequently replaced by a common external tariff, 
o Agricultural development programs. 
oThe channeling of resources to provide for the necessary investments. 
oPhysical integration. 
oPreferential treatment for Bolivia and Ecuador. (Wengel, 1980: 7) 
There were two major innovations that were developed in order to speed up 
industrial growth in the region because, as Fontaine says in the Washington Papers: "the 
merging of five or six impoverished economies—would not be enough. . .bolder measures 
were needed." (Fontaine, 1977: 14) The first of these innovations was the multilateral 
control of foreign investment. It was felt among the leaders of the Pact that the presence 
of foreign investment harmed local capital and increased the power of the foreigner. In 
June of 1971, The Pact ratified Decision 24, which placed tight controls on future as well 
as foreign investment (Fontaine, 1977: 15) 
The second and "grandest" of the measures was promoting industrialization 
through sectoral planning (Fontaine, 1977: 14). This type of planning called for 
agreements to be made among member countries to assign each country exclusive rights 
to the manufacture of new products within major heavy industries. A system of industrial 
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distribution was called for to overcome the disparities in transportation costs and poor 
infrastructures that plagued the weaker member states. 
The institutions of the Andean Pact designed to bring about these objectives were 
as follows: 
The Commission—the highest political authority, at least on paper. It was 
a legislative policy and is responsible for implementing the national interests of 
the Group. It expresses its will by means of decisions but also is under the 
obligation to review any proposals made by the Junta. In practice, the 
Commission proved to have a lesser degree of success than previously 
anticipated. The lack of supranational authority in the Commission gave the 
member countries breathing room to disregard many of its decisions. Between 
1981 and 1984, when regional forces began to wane in the face of a resurgence of 
national interests, member states increasingly disregarded the decisions made by 
the Commission (Adkisson, 2003: 373). 
The Junta—the Group's technical body responsible for defending the 
common interest of the subregion. It is made up of three members who were 
appointed by the Commission that have the ability to make autonomous decisions. 
These decisions are of lesser ranking than those of the Commission, but not 
withstanding, the Junta has been the most important body in the Pact. The Junta 
has acted as the executive body of the Pact and although it can make resolutions 
independent from the Commission, much of its resolutions have been adopted by 
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the Commission. The majority of the decisions created by the Commission 
originated in the Junta (Angarita, 1988: 145). 
The Andean Court of Justice—the judicial body of the Pact, organized in 
1983, responsible for ensuring strict compliance with all commitments of the 
Agreement . Its judgments were legally binding in the member countries. 
Unfortunately, the formation of the Court of Justice was created too late ensure 
the complete compliance of member countries. By 1983, the member states of the 
Pact were disillusioned with regional integration and were resorting back to 
nationalistic interests. The court judges themselves openly recognized that the 
"Court has suffered from a frustrating inertia, resulting in part from the crisis that 
the Andean integration process is undergoing" (Angarita, 1988: 147). 
The Andean Counci l—a political advisory body set up to guide the 
activities of the institutions of the Andean system. It was formed in 1979 and is 
still a major organization in the Community. The Council is made up of the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Andean Nations. The Council drafts foreign 
policy for the Pact and its focus was driven towards overcoming obstacles of the 
integration process. The effects of the Council have been mixed. The Council is 
able to draft foreign policy more effectively because of its awareness of the 
individual interests of the member states. However, this did not solve the problem 
of the lack compliance of member states to Andean policy (Angarita 1988: 147). 
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The Andean Parliament—an advisory body created in 1979 as a result of 
the growing degree of democratization in the region. It analyzes annual reports 
and endeavors to improve integration, enhance democracy, and protect human 
rights. One of the most positive results from this body was the ties it built with 
the European Parliament. By 1986, seven joint meetings were held between 
Andean and European Parliaments to discuss democracy and human rights in 
Latin America (Angarita, 1988: 149). Representatives from the Community, 
Mercosur, and the European Union have continued to meet since then to discuss 
further integration (International Monetary Fund, 2010: 92). 
The Andean Reserve Fund—set up in 1978—it gives loans, bonds, and 
accepts deposits to provide greater liquidity in the region and to support the 
growth of its members . The Consultative Committee, the Advisory Committee 
for Economic and Social Affairs, the Coordination Councils, and the Andean 
Development Corporation are all subsidiary bodies designed to facilitate efforts 
between the Pact, its member governments, and regional enterprises. (Angarita, 
1988:151) 
The Andean Pact was not and had never been politically homogeneous. Its 
policies toward integration varied. In the early 1970s, Colombia and Ecuador favored 
free enterprise, Chile was moving towards its own brand of socialism, Peru began 
nationalizing its industries after the military took power in 1969, and Bolivia swung one 
way to the other with much frequency (Morawetz, 1974: 38). Even the types of 
government varied and were on nearly opposite ends of the spectrum: Venezuela and 
Colombia were two of the more liberal democracies in Latin America, Peru had just 
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undergone a military coup that stripped the country of its democracy, Chile had recently 
become socialistic and in 1973 would undergo a military coup, and Ecuador and Bolivia 
were both unstable military-led regimes (Fontaine, 1977: 29-30). Despite these 
differences, all these countries shared the same vision expressed in the Cartagena 
Agreement that they needed to work together economically to compete in international 
economics to improve their domestic economies and standard of living. 
Cris is a n d F r a g m e n t a t i o n 
This section analyzes the outcome of Andean Pact and its efforts. By analyzing 
the development of intra-regional trade, the establishment of a common external tariff, 
and the implementat ion of the Pact 's sector program, this section discusses how the 
closed economic tendencies of the Pact 's member states led to the decline of the Pact and 
economic prosperity as a whole in the region. 
The signers of the Cartagena Agreement in 1969 called for a growth of intra-
regional trade by increasing trade liberalization. Trade liberalization was an aggressive 
strategy on paper (Fontaine, 1977: 15) but in reality, the founders of the Cartagena 
Agreement did not initially anticipate a lot of benefits from greater trade (Wengel, 1980: 
2). The Andean countries were not large trading partners in the 1960s because they 
followed the same economic strategy of exporting raw materials to more industrialized 
countries like the U.S. and Europe (Wengel, 1980: 3). In 1969, for example, intra-
Andean exports only accounted for 5 % of total Andean exports (Morawetz, 1974: 5). 
The gains to be made on an increase in trade were generally small because these products 
were not heavily taxed anyway. 
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Some of the major obstacles to the growth of intra-Andean trade have been, as 
ment ioned previously, the poor transportation systems in the Pact. Despite the distances, 
transportation costs in many cases were higher for trade between member countries than 
from a member country to the U.S. or Europe (Morawetz, 1974: 14). Suppliers found it 
more beneficial to sell their goods to foreign buyers than to regional consumers. 
The reluctance of member states to lower tariffs proved to be anther hindrance to 
trade. Especially in the case of Bolivia and Ecuador, a concern materialized in the Pact 
that the stronger economies would use the weaker economies as merely another market 
and that they would not participate in the growth of the Pact (Fontaine, 1977: 33). To 
overcome this hesitancy, it was agreed upon that intra-regional tariffs would be cut 10% 
each year to bring a gradual reduction of tariffs by the end of 1980 (Morawetz, 1974: 6). 
On top of that, each country was permitted to be exempt from 250 to 600 " i tems" from 
this process of liberation until 1985. The richer countries only received 250 exemptions 
while Bolivia and Ecuador were granted 600 exemptions (Fontaine, 1977: 16). 
During the late 1970s as tariffs were gradually coming down there were some 
positive results in an increase in trade. A relatively important market was established for 
the intra-regional trading of agricultural products, in a specific case of Colombia 
becoming the leading buyer of non-coffee exports (Londono, 1988: 28). Also, there was 
an increase in intra-regional trade in the 1970s in which intra-Andean trade jumped 
nearly 2 0 % each year (Fontaine, 1977: 56). In comparison to the average world trade 
increases of 10% per year, the Andean figures looked impressive (Fontain, 1977: 56). 
Beginning in the early 1980s intra-regional trade dropped in the Andean countries. 
"The decline in trade lagged with respect to the Central American Common Market and 
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LAIA as a whole ." (Ocampo, 1988: 123) In fact, an international debt crisis was 
threatening the majority of the world 's economies (Reeve, 1993: 37). This crisis came 
into being after the 1978 oil crisis when oil prices again began to rise, causing inflation in 
Western markets. The Federal Reserve responded by adopting a monetary policy in 
which interest rates were risen. This led to rapid appreciation of the dollar, which in turn, 
created an instability in exchange rates and caused many private and public industries to 
accumulate large amounts of debt (Eskridge, 1985: 35-41). 
Many economies responded to the crisis by turning inward and focusing on 
closing their economies in an attempt to protect them. The effects this had on the Andean 
Pact were devastating. In 1981, trade dropped by 3 .5% in the Pact. Trade dropped 
another 1.4% drop the following year, and a real collapse came in 1983 with a loss of 
4 9 % of trade (Ocampo, 1988: 123). The Junta concluded in 1980 that "The member 
countries are not convinced that an enlarged market actually exists" (Puyana, 1988: 82). 
By then, although a free trade zone was in effect, trade was declining. 
The establishment of a common external tariff was also one of the main objectives 
of the Agreement that failed to come into practice fully. The problems associated with 
the common external tariff were similar to those of the formation of a free trade area in 
that the member countries had different tariff policies toward third countries and were 
hesitant to change them (Morawetz, 1974: 38). Bolivia had the lowest amount of tariffs 
in the Pact because of the country's dependence on foreign goods while Chile had the 
highest amount of tariffs (Morawetz, 1974: 33). Chile 's tariff policy changed 
dramatically after the military coup of 1973, in which the government was prone to lower 
these tariffs. To help ease the member states into the adoption of the tariff wall, the Pact 
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initiated a program that called for the creation of a common minimum external tariff by 
1975 that would be a 'dry run ' before the common external tariff would be established in 
1980 (Morawetz, 1974: 65). A common min imum external tariff was an agreement that 
tariffs could remain above but not below the common minimum (Morawetz, 1974: 31). 
The common external tariff never did come into force as planned. Except for 
Bolivia, the Andean nations already had high tariffs in place (Morawetz, 1974: 31) so 
there was only moderate interest in setting a common tariff. Since Bolivia was the 
unquestioned weakest member of the Pact, the rest of the Group tolerated Bolivian 
deviation from the rules (Penaherrera, 1988: 180-181). Negotiations were stalled and the 
deadline for the establishment of the tariff was postponed (Wengel, 1980: 56) until the 
international debt crisis pushed the issue of the common external tariff out of the lime 
light. 
The issue over foreign investment was perhaps the main cause for the near 
dissolution of the Andean Pact. Decision 24 required the nations of the Pact to (1) 
exclude future foreign investment from certain basic industries and (2) adopt a fade-out 
program requiring existing companies to give local (and governmental) investors 
majority control (51%) of total shares (Fontaine, 1977: 19). Over the period of a few 
years, foreign companies that operated in the Andean countries were required to 
gradually sell shares of stock of property in the given country to local buyers until 51 % of 
the total shares was in the hands of local investors. 
Tension over this issue began after Pinochet 's military government took power in 
Chile in 1973. Its reversal in foreign investment policy contradicted that of Decision 24. 
Chile was not the only government to favor foreign investment. Colombia had been an 
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advocate for foreign investment in the 1960s and 1970s but had chosen to accept 
Decision 24 because of their interest in the free market open to them in the Andean Pact 
(Wengel, 1980: 9). Bolivia had also willingly accepted the presence of foreign 
investment and had already been allowing foreign investment into the country and 
directly violating the terms of the Decision (Fontaine, 1977: 21). Because of its weak 
economy, Andean governments let Bolivia continue its activities; Chile was not so lucky. 
It was called out on encouraging foreign investment and the negotiations and conflicts 
that ensued caused for the eventual withdrawal of Chile from the Pact (Penaherrera, 
1988: 175). 
The last and the most important program that will be discussed is the Andean 
sectoral planning. This effort was developed as a way to promote rapid industrialization 
in all the member countries (Fontaine, 1977: 16). In theory, once a common market was 
established and free trade opened up in the Pact, the increased demand for domestically-
produced manufactured goods would rise and spawn domestic industries. The sectoral 
program, or SPIDs (Sectoral Planning of Industrial Development), was an initiative taken 
by the Pact to spread out industrial growth throughout the Andean region (Fontaine, 
1977: 17). It was distributional in nature in which the six countries of the region would 
be assigned the rights to certain industries and has been described as the "most ambitious 
attempt at central direction ever attempted by any transnational communi ty" (Fontaine, 
1977: 16). 
The SIDPs focused on four main industries: the light engineering program, the 
petrochemical program, the automobile program, and the iron and steel program. Since 
the automobile and iron and steel programs were agreed upon later, they never fully 
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materialized into action. The light engineering and petrochemical programs will only be 
analyzed in this paper. 
The petrochemical program was chosen for a number of reasons to be included in 
the SIDPs. First of all, petroleum and natural gas are the principle raw materials needed 
to produce these goods. The Andean nations are exporters of both these materials and 
have surpluses adequate enough to support the industry (Wengel, 1980: 60). Another 
reason is that in the 1970s, the petrochemical industry was concentrated in developed 
countries. This resulted in the exportation of oil from developing countries to developed 
countries. The developed countries would then produce petrochemicals and sell them 
back to the developing countries for higher prices (Wengel, 1980: 59). Nevertheless, the 
demand for petrochemicals in the Andean area was estimated to be around $245 million 
in the late 1970s. For this reason, the petrochemical industry was very attractive to the 
developing world. The final reason for the selection of this industry is that it was suited 
for cooperation schemes because it exhibits significant economies of scale until a certain 
plant size is reached (Wengel, 1980: 60). 
In this program, 56 industries were to be distributed across six countries 
beginning in 1975. A total of $2.5 billion worth of investment would be required to 
purchase technology and equipment. The members of the Pact agreed to share the burden 
of the costs by dividing the costs among themselves (Wengel, 1980: 61). Chile and 
Colombia eventually gave up their SIDPs claims to be able to maintain low tariffs with a 
number of third countries, but the rest of the countries actively took part (Puyana, 1988: 
80). 
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The petrochemical program floundered in the late 70s and early 80s. Negotiations 
had taken far longer than anyone ever anticipated. The program was not even ratified 
until 1975 and did not start taking effect for another few years (Puyana, 1988: 81). One 
of the problems the Pact faced was due to the radical (and often opposing) economic 
policies. Many of the industries mentioned were state-owned industries. Colombia, 
Peru, and Venezuela already had well-established state-owned petrochemical industries 
(Fontaine, 1977: 18). Countries were not comfortable with allowing other Latin 
American states have access to technology without themselves also possessing that 
technology. "Delays also provided an incentive for member countries to rush into plant 
construction and thus create faits accomplish, or slipshod industrial development." 
(Fontaine, 1977: 17) 
Apart from this main obstacle, the Pact encountered a high level of difficulty in 
evenly promoting economic growth without inequalities. There was no way (at least no 
way that is not very inexpensive, difficult or bias) to measure the data to determine the 
costs of the individual countries in accordance with the benefits (Wengel, 1980: 5). In 
short, the negotiating process took too long because no one could agree on the location or 
implementation of the industries. 
The light engineering program was the most successful of the SIDPs. It required 
an investment of $450 million and generated 40,000 jobs in a matter of a few years. Its 
annual value of production is calculated to be $500 million in 1974 and the demand in 
1980 was over $800 million (Puyana, 1988: 81). Apart from this, there was a noticeable 
rise in intra-Andean trade of machine tools and electrical machinery. There is evidence 
however, that suggests the trade in this sector increased because thirty-three of the 
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seventy-two units allocated were in production before the signing of the program 
(Puyana, 1988: 82). Even the $21.4 mil l ion dollar investments were allocated to the 
expansion of existing productions in Colombia and Peru (Puyana, 1988: 82). This gives 
rise to the question of how much the program actually contributed to the success of this 
industry. 
Conc lus ion 
The Andean Pact was put to the test when an economic crisis in the early 1980s 
hit the international market, forcing many economies to return to autarkic policies. Intra-
Andean trade crumbled, the common external tariff and sectoral programs floundered, 
and member countries repeatedly failed to observe the articles of Agreement after 1980 
(Penaherrera, 1988: 175). The countries in the Pact shared the same vision of 
industrialization, but shared little else in common. Market-oriented economic policy 
structures were rare in the subregion and each country still believed strongly in closed-
economics rooted in nationalism and government interventionalism. Although this was 
an extraordinary effort that achieved much that had never been done before in South 
America, the Pact was unlike the European Union in that it failed to open up its member 
countries ' economies and fully integrate. Although they were experimenting with open 
market-policies, the member states of the Pact still clung to outdated import-substitution 
tactics. Another main hindrance came from the interventionalistic nature of the Andean 
governments. A realist perspective flourished in the Andean countries and the Pact 
responded by discouraging foreign investment and only reluctantly lowering intra-
regional tariffs. The member countries themselves sabotaged the sectoral program out of 
36 
mistrust towards one another and regional cooperation became less important national 
interests. 
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C H A P T E R THREE 
THE A N D E A N C O M M U N T Y — A RENOVATION IN INTEGRATION 
In M a y of 1994, Paul W. Moore and Rebecca K. Hunt said: 
"The Andean Community is one of the oldest free trade movements 
existing today... changes in democratic governance and developments in 
trade and investment liberalization have prompted renewed interest and 
action among members. 
"The Group has progressed far beyond a free trade agreement, as it begins 
to implement a customs union similar to the European Union." (Hunt, 
Rebecca K. and Moore, Paul W., 1994: 1) 
Many states reacted to the international debt crisis by to closing up, establishing 
protective tariffs, and becoming hesitant to sign economic agreements of free trade with 
other countries. This decade was a decade of silence for the Andean Community in 
comparison to the 1970s. In 1983, the Andean Court of Justice entered into effect and 
there were only other small attempts at renewing the integration process ("Andean 
Communi ty" : Welcome Page). The Pact, however, did not die out completely. 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, a new movement in deregulation was led by Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher (O'Brien, 1992: 18). "Their market-friendly 
administrations, in addition to pursuing privatization, tax reductions and less 
interventionist policies, began to remove exchange controls, eliminate regulations on 
interest rates, dismantle barriers among different types of financial institutions, and open 
domestic markets to foreigners." (Spero, 1988-89: 155) Exchange controls in the U.K. 
were eliminated within days after Thatcher took office as Prime Minister (Crook, 1992: 
14). Other deregulation movements soon followed in Canada, France, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and West Germany (Reeve, 1993: 17). 
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The U.S. shift toward deregulation triggered economic policy changes worldwide 
because of the tremendous size of the U.S. economy. The fast pace of deregulation 
spawned more multinational corporations, a dramatic increase in trade, and the 
emergence of a powerful global capital market (Reeve, 1993: 18). The old protectionist 
practices of import substitution were abandoned as more countries began opening up their 
markets in the name of competition (Reeve, 1993: 17). 
The Andean Pact was affected by the wave of Reaganomics as a new spirit of 
economic integration influenced the member countries to once again push ahead in the 
integration process. Beginning in 1987 with the signing to the Quito Protocol, the 
member states of the Group started toward the process of not only renewing but 
reorganizing the objectives and tools of the union. Two major changes were to take 
place. Import substitution and state-regulation industrial development were to be 
replaced by a focus on free market competition. The Pact also developed a political 
agenda as it started openly promoting democratization ("Who Are We?- Andean 
Communi ty -CAN."). Instead of tolerating military coups and dictatorships, the Pact 
would condemn them. 
Democra t i za t i on in the C o m m u n i t y 
On June 10, 2000, the Council of the Presidents of the Andean Community signed 
the "Andean Commitment to Democracy." The first paragraphs of this document read: 
REAFFIRMING the Cartagena Agreement, which states that the Member 
Countries agree to sign the Subregional Integration Agreement "Founded 
on principles of equality, justice, peace, solidarity, and democracy"; 
STRESSING that the Andean Communi ty is a community of democratic 
nations that have shown a sustained will to promote democratic living and 
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the constitutional state, both in the Andean Subregion and in Latin 
America and Caribbean ever since the birth of their integration movement; 
ASSERTING that the aim of the Andean Community 's political action and 
of its common foreign policy is to develop, improve, and consolidate 
democracy and the constitutional state; and 
RATIFYING the Presidential Declaration on the Andean Community 
Commitment to Democracy, signed in Bogota on August 7, 1998("Who 
Are We?- Andean Community -CAN.") 
At least on paper, the Andean Pact had always been a promoter of democracy. 
Upon the signing of the Cartagena Agreement in 1969, it would appear as if the subregion 
was heading towards a rapid democratization. The only member states controlled by 
generals or dictators were Bolivia and Ecuador—the two weakest members of the Pact. 
Within a few years and after two military coups, the political atmosphere reversed in the 
Pact. The only two democratic states left by 1974 were Colombia and Venezuela. 
During the 1970s and through much of the 80s, the Pact set democracy aside as a priority 
and instead focused primarily on economic issues. In the late 1980s, when the Pact 
began actively promoting democracy, political disputes arose between member countries 
(Penaherrera, 1988: 175). 
These disputes faded and, in 1989, the Presidents of the Andean countries met in 
the Galapagos to discuss the reorganization of the Pact ("Who Are We?- Andean 
Communi ty -CAN."). The 'Strategic Design ' was approved that replaced the close-
market system with one of open development. A year later, the Andean Presidents ' 
Council was created as a formal body of the Pact. The Council comprised only of the 
Presidents of each member country. Under the Trujillo Protocol signed in 1997, highest 
authority was given to the Presidents ' Council ("Who Are We?- Andean Community -
CAN.") . 
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In fact, the old institutions of the Pact were replaced in this year by the Council of 
Foreign Ministers, the Andean Community Commission, the General Secretariat, the 
Latin American Reserve Fund, the Andean Health Organization, the Consultative Council 
of Indigenous Peoples, the Andean Labor Advisory Council, the Andean Business 
Advisory Council, the Simon Rodriguez Convention, and the Simon Bolivar Andean 
University ("Who Are We?- Andean Community -CAN."). The Andean Court of Justice, 
the Andean Parliament, and the Andean Development Corporation all existed in the Pact 
in the early 1980s and were kept when the Pact was revamped. These institutions have 
more political and social implications than their predecessors. These organizations work 
to strengthen social equality and improvement in the Community. The Andean Health 
Organization coordinates and supports "the efforts made by member countries, both 
individually and jointly, for health improvement of their people" ("Who Are We?-
Andean Communi ty -CAN."). 
The Consultative Council of Indigenous Peoples is made of delegates from the 
various indigenous groups in the subregion. It expresses its will to the Commission or 
General Secretariat and works with a number of other organizations to improve relations 
among indigenous peoples, human rights, education, and overall participation of these 
groups in the Communi ty ("Who Are We?- Andean Communi ty -CAN."). 
The Andean Business Advisory Council is made up of four delegates from the 
private sector and works to communicate between the Commission and private enterprise. 
Its main function is to increase participation of the private sector in the Community as the 
Communi ty becomes integrated into a common market. The Andean Labor Advisory 
Council is comprised of delegates from organizations in the labor sector. Its function is 
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to increase participation from this sector in the Communi ty ("Who Are We?- Andean 
Communi ty -CAN."). 
In 1997 the General Secretariat, the executive body of the Community, was 
created. The General Secretariat took on the function of the Junta in the Cartagena 
Agreement. It is under the direction of a Secretary General who is elected by the Andean 
Council of Foreign Ministers. The General Secretary can be a citizen of any one of the 
member countries and the General Secretary has been filled by a citizen of each of the 
countries since 1997 ("Who Are We?- Andean Communi ty -CAN."). 
Since then, the Community has been taking on an increasing amount of 
responsibilities of a political organization. In 2000, the members signed the "Andean 
Communi ty ' s Commitment to Democracy". This document outlined the Andean 
Communi ty ' s vision of democracy. Article One states that "democratic institutions and a 
constitutional state.... are essential to the political cooperation, and the process of 
economic, social, and culture integration" ("Who Are We?- Andean Communi ty -CAN."). 
The document goes on to say that if there is a "disruption of the democratic order in any 
Member Country, the other Andean Communi ty Member Countries shall consult with 
each other and. . . with the country involved" ("Who Are We?- Andean Communi ty -
CAN.") . If the problem is not solved in the country and if these developments work to 
undermine the integration process, the Member Country will be dealt with in one of the 
following ways: 
a. Suspension of the Member Country 's participation in any of the bodies of the 
Andean Integration System; 
b. Suspension of its participation in the international cooperation projects carried 
out by the Member Countries; 
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c.Extension of the suspension to other System bodies, including its 
disqualification by Andean financial institutions from obtaining access to facilities or 
loans; 
d. Suspension of rights to which it is entitled under the Cartagena Agreement and 
of the right to coordinate external action in other spheres; and 
e. Other measures and actions that are deemed pertinent under International Law. 
("Who Are We?- Andean Community -CAN.") 
In its relations with third countries, Community members are to follow Article 8 
which states, "The Andean Community shall seek to incorporate a democratic clause in 
the agreements it signs with third parties, in accordance with the criteria set out in this 
Protocol." ("Who Are We?- Andean Communi ty -CAN.") In 2002, the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs and of Defense approved the Andean Charter for Peace and Security. 
This charter laid down the principles and commitments for formulating a Community 
policy on security in the subregion, established a peace zone, regional efforts in the war 
against terrorism and the limitation of foreign defense spending ("Who Are We?- Andean 
Communi ty -CAN."). Also, this same year, a committee was formed for disaster 
prevention and care, a strategy was developed on biodiversity for the tropical Andean 
countries, and the Andean Charter for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights was 
adopted. 
Political and social integration occurred in 2003 when the Communi ty announced 
the Andres Bello Agreement, designed to strengthen mutual cooperation in matters of 
common interest related to education, culture, science, and technology. This would lead 
to the creation of the Andean Identity and the integration of the peoples of subregion 
countries ("Who Are We?- Andean Communi ty -CAN."). For the first t ime since Simon 
Bolivar, political and economic leaders were seriously considering the formation of an 
"Andean" cultural unity. 
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These efforts flowered into the creation of new subsidiary institutions in 2004. 
The Andean Council of Education Ministers and Persons Responsible for Cultural Policy, 
the Andean Council of Ministers of Social Development, the Andean Community Council 
of Ministers of the Environment and Sustainable Development and the Andean Advisory 
Council of Municipal Authorities were created to "promote a culture of integration and 
strengthening the Andean cultural identity" ("Who Are We?- Andean Community -
CAN.") . On top of that, a working program was approved for the incorporation of 
integration subjects into school programs. 
There have been a number of obstacles that have hindered democratization. The 
first major problem was during the 1990s and 2000s, when not all of A N C O M member 
countries maintained a working democracy. From 1997 to 2006, Ecuador underwent a 
series of military coups and presidents in exile ("Ecuador": U.S. Department of State). 
Colombia has been in a state of semi-civil war from the late 1990s to 2002 when drug 
cartels and FARC rebels battled government troops for territory and power (CIA- The 
World Fact Book). The most obvious obstacle was the withdrawal of Venezuela from the 
Community. The motive behind this withdrawal was interventionalist in nature because 
the move had visibly negative effects on the country's economy. Venezuela withdrew 
from the Pact in response to Colombia 's signing of a free trade agreement with the U.S. 
("Venezuela and Colombia: Politics versus Trade | The Economist"). The Venezuela 
government is not subtle in its political antagonism toward the U.S. and its withdrawal 
was characterized as an economic weapon used to punish the Community. 
In spite of the setbacks the Community has faced in recent years toward political, 
social, and cultural integration, it has made many advances. The political instability in 
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Ecuador that was rampant in the 1990s was finally stabilized in 2007 by its new 
president, Rafael Correa. Upon coming to power, Correa called for the drafting of a new 
constitution, restored political stability and provided a working democracy that has 
proven to be sustainable ("Ecuador": U.S. Department of State). 
In Colombia, President Uribe's successful domestic security policies, and pro-
market reforms effectively restored peace to most of the country starting in 2002 ( C I A -
The World Fact Book). Government forces retook most of the lost territory claimed by 
the FARC and cut down much of the power held by drug cartels. 
The situation in Venezuela was a blow to the Community, especially since 
Venezuela was seen as a possible link to M E R C O S U R . The remaining heads of state of 
the member countries reaffirmed their "vocation for integration and firm intent to 
strengthen A N C O M " in light of the crisis created by Venezuela ("Who Are We?- Andean 
Communi ty -CAN.") . Within a year of Venezuela's withdrawal, A N C O M enjoyed the 
membership of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile in the Group. These 
countries were accepted as associate members and would enjoy some benefits of being a 
part of the Communi ty but with no decision-making power. 
During the 1990s and 2000s, the majority of the member countries enjoyed 
having working democracies. Bolivia, as of 1999, was in its second decade of 
democratic rule and had reached perhaps its highest degree of democratization in the 
country's history in spite of a weak judicial structure ("Economy - Bolivia - Tax, Import, 
Export, Average, Growth, Tariff, Annual , Sector."). Peru is also enjoying 
democratization. The Shining Path Maoist movement was put down and a greater degree 
of political stability was restored to the country (CIA - The World Fact Book). Peru is 
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now ranked by the Freedom House Index as a "free" country. Corruption is not as 
widespread, legislative and judicial institutions are stronger than in the past, and human 
rights advocates won a major victory when the government announced the repeal of a law 
that exemplified the military from being held responsible for human rights abuses 
(Freedom House, 2010). 
One of the principle motives for the leaders of the Andean Communi ty to push for 
political, social, and cultural integration was their desire to form a common market. For 
example, the Communi ty describes the purpose of its subsidiary bodies as to achieving 
attainment of "fuller participation" by this sector "in the construction of an integration 
process leading to the creation of a common market" ("Who Are We?- Andean 
Communi ty -CAN."). Full economic integration did not prove to be possible in the case 
of the Andean Pact because of differing political policies between member countries and 
a lack of cultural and social harmonization. In the case of the Andean Community, the 
leaders of the Group are making these initiatives to overcome these trends. 
F ree T r a d e a n d an E x p a n d i n g C o m m o n M a r k e t 
One of the major changes made in the reorganization of the Andean Pact and the 
formation of the Andean Communi ty has been its new perspective on trade liberalization. 
Starting in 1991, the Communi ty adopted its "open skies" policy and called for the 
elimination of tariffs within the group by 1993 ("Who Are We?- Andean Community -
CAN.") . Unlike the free trade zone of the 1970s, there would be little room for countries 
to pick out specific industries that would be exempt from the policy. On top of this, a 
common external tariff was outlined and due to be in effect by 1995. Foreign investment 
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would not only be tolerated but also encouraged as a way to bring jobs and industry to the 
member states ("Who Are We?- Andean Communi ty -CAN."). 
Many of the previously mentioned institutions, such as the Andean Business 
Advisory Council, were aimed toward encouraging privatization and market-oriented 
policies. The institutions of the Communi ty ' s predecessor were designed to help member 
states control their economies through regulation, centralized planning and manipulation 
of industrial manufacturing. The aim of the institutions of the Communi ty is aimed at 
encouraging private business to have a voice and take part in the integration process 
("Who Are We?- Andean Community -CAN."). In 2000, A N C O M sponsored its 3 r d 
Andean Business Forum in Lima. This Convention saw the participation of 
representatives from over 1,000 businesses from the private sector ("Who Are We?-
Andean Communi ty -CAN.") . 
Another one of A N C O M ' s objectives was to encourage free trade with other 
countries outside the Community. On November 15, 2004, the Heads of Foreign 
Ministers of the Andean Communi ty met with the Heads of Foreign Ministers of 
M E R C O S U R and signed the Economic Cooperation Agreement. This agreement marked 
the creation of the fifth largest trade bloc in the world. Together, A N C O M and 
M E R C O S U R , the bloc has over 350 million consumers, a gross national product of $800 
billion and trade of $30 billion ("Mercosur, Ancom Create World's Fifth Largest Trade 
Bloc." The World Trade Review). Negotiations over the issue of free trade have occurred 
between the Community, Chile, the European Union, the United States, and Canada. 
Free trade agreements have been made with all of these entities (International Monetary 
Fund, 2005). For example, Peru and Colombia have signed free trade agreements with 
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the United States (CIA - The World Fact Book). Trade agreements were made between 
Chile and Venezuela in 1993, Colombia and Chile in 1994, and Chile and Peru in 1998 
(International Monetary Fund, 2005: 93). In 1998, A N C O M announced the beginnings 
of negotiations for an agreement with Panama ("ICTSD • A N C O M Looks Forward to 
Free Trade With Panama, Mercosur."). 
Other efforts to liberalize trade were made by lowering tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs). While tariffs and N T B s were eliminated between the Andean countries, 
Andean tariff walls were lowered in general toward third countries. The average tariff 
dispersion in the area declined from 3 0 % in the mid-1980s to 10% by 2001 . NTBs were 
also lowered from an average of 4 0 % in the mid-1980s to around 6% in 
2001 (International Monetary Fund, 2005: 92). 
Since 1995 progress has been made in the establishment of a common market. In 
1995, the four-level common external tariff came into effect. In 2003, the Communi ty 
officially notified the World Trade Organization that the Community operates as a 
customs union. The transportation services between the member countries have been 
liberalized and Ecuador and Colombia began sharing electricity ("Who Are We?- Andean 
Communi ty -CAN." ) . 
In spite of the progress the Andean Community has made to foster trade, the 
Community, along with Latin America as a whole continues to lag behind the rest of the 
world in export goods and services. Even in comparison to other developing economies, 
the region is slow to accelerate trade. Between 1991 and 2001 , for example, Latin 
American exports as a share of Gross Domestic Product rose from 1 5 % to 2 1 % . This 
remained low in comparison to Eastern Europe, Africa, and East Asian countries; Eastern 
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European countries had an average export share of GDP at 42%, African countries were 
around 3 5 % and East Asian countries were around 3 2 % (International Monetary Fund, 
2005: 92). 
Experts believe one of the main factors that cause this hindrance is the nature of 
Latin American export economies. Most Latin American exports are either raw materials 
or agricultural products. In order to protect domestic agriculture, most industrialize 
countries use subsidies and NTBs to discourage agricultural imports. Agricultural 
protectionism in industrialized countries is costly for Latin America. For example, if 
subsidies in the U.S. were cut by 50% exports from Latin America would increase by 9%. 
If subsidies were cut by 5 0 % in Europe, Japan, and Canada, exports would increase by 
2 0 % in Latin America (International Monetary Fund, 2005: 96). 
Conc lus ion 
There have been a number of positive effects of free trade policies bases on 
privatization and democratization. According to A N C O M , since the signing of the 
Cartagena Agreement, there has been an 82-fold increase in intra-subregional exports, 
which rose from $111 mill ion dollars to $9 billion 72 million by 2005. There has been a 
multiplication by 37 of accrued foreign investment, which climbed from $3.4 billion 
dollars in 1970 to $127.311 billion by 2005. The growth in manufactured products traded 
as a percentage among the Andean countries went from 4 8 % in 1970 to 8 4 % by 2005 
("Who Are We?- Andean Community -CAN.") . Paul W. Moore and Rebecca K. Hunt of 
the U.S. Department of Commerce also reported a number of positive figures. They 
reported that only after one year the formation of the free trade area, trade between 
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Colombia and Ecuador rose 76%. Trade between Colombia and Venezuela increased 
250%, from $1 billion to $2.5 billion. Overall trade between Peru and the rest of the 
Communi ty rose 2 9 % (Hunt, Rebecca K. and Moore, Paul, W., 1994: 1). 
A number of factors explain these outcomes. First of all, a stronger commitment 
to democracy in the Community led to greater policy harmonization among member 
countries. An adoption of an open market-oriented policy in the Community freed trade. 
The encouragement of foreign investment brought more industries and created more jobs 
for Andeans. The presence of Reaganomics in world economics provided for lower 
tariffs in third countries, thus allowing Andean businesses to more easily sell their 
products abroad and also establish industries in Andean countries. Finally, the 
Communi ty gave the member countries the ability to act as one voice in FTAA 
negotiations, effectively increasing their bargaining power ("Who Are We?- Andean 
Communi ty -CAN.") . 
A N C O M still needs to overcome several obstacles before it can succeed in 
becoming a major economic force in the world like the European Union or NAFTA. In 
spite of recent advances in cooperation among member countries to promote stability and 
democracy, the Freedom House Index still ranks Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and 
Venezuela as "partly free" (Freedom House Index, 2010). Civil strife, corruption and 
unstable government institutions in these countries impede economic growth and 
discourage foreign investment. On top of this, Andean countries need to dedicate more 
efforts towards improvements in infrastructure. Private enterprises complain about the 
high levels of congestion and insignificant organization in Andean ports. Delays because 
of customs administrative policies usually result in a wait of nine days instead of five 
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compared to most other countries (International Monetary Fund, 2005: 98). With the 
example of the advances made in the past two decades in the Andean Community, it can 
be seen that the member states of the Community should continue to pursue open 
economic policies. 
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CONCLUSION: F U T U R E OR FRAGMENTION? 
As shown by the Andean Community, developing countries have much to benefit 
by forming economic integration schemes and opening their economies. The basic 
structure of economic integration protects the individual economies against "giant" 
economies like those of the United States and Europe. Individually, these countries 
cannot compete with the "giant" economies. Through cooperation, the developed 
countries pool together and gain political and economic leverage in world affairs. Also, 
when the member countries of the Communi ty invested in liberal open-economic 
policies, the overall economies of these countries experienced growth in exports and 
GDR Economic progress was also made through combined efforts to promote 
democracy and political stability in the region. As of 2011, of all the member states of 
the Communi ty Peru is the most politically stable. Peru is also the country that is 
growing fastest economically (ISA April 2011 Country Reports). As these same countries 
resorted to realist closed-economic policies their respective economies suffered because 
of the lack of trade and foreign investment. 
The Andean Community has been one of the most successful integration schemes 
in history in spite of being located in one of the poorer regions in the world where 
countries tend to prioritize closed economies over open economies. Continued success 
will depend on the degree to which the Communi ty is able to harmonize economic and 
political policy in order to promote further advances in trade and foreign investment. As 
this happens, other economies will look at the Community as one large market instead of 
many small markets. Capital, foreign investment, and trade agreements will more likely 
spill into the region. 
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The success of the Communi ty also is in the hands of the individual member 
countries to avoid political turmoil. Any military coup, dictator or civil war can seriously 
hinder the Communi ty ' s ability to integrate. The democracy of Bolivia, for example, was 
seriously threatened in 2008 when armed conflict erupted in Santa Cruz. Because of the 
high level of integration attained by the Community, severe political turmoil in one 
member country will negatively affect the other countries as well. 
As part of policy harmonization, a renewed effort among the member countries to 
develop market-oriented economic policies will promote successful integration. The 
Community, like any integration scheme, needs policy harmonization because the 
sovereignty of the member states allows them to pursue their own course. However, if all 
the countries are committed to improving their economies, they are more likely to 
cooperate to achieve this. For this reason, the process will be helped if the privatization of 
their respective industries is achieved to the fullest extent possible. 
Not only will this improve policy harmonization, it will also help improve their 
economies. For example, Venezuela's economy suffered after its government 
implemented the nationalization of the oil industry. Even after oil prices doubled among 
importer countries, wages for the oil workers in the country have been reportedly falling 
("Venezuela's Oil-dependent Economy: Socialism on the Never-never | The Economist."). 
In the Community, the Ecuadorian government still has possession of many industries, 
including the oil industry. This is causing a reduced amount of private sector investment 
that is hurting the economy ("Ecuador." U.S. Department of State). 
To an extent, some of the factors are out of A N C O M ' s control. There is always a 
risk that another economic crisis will hit the international market. Historically, economic 
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recessions have driven countries to adopt protectionist economic policies. The individual 
member countries o f A N C O M should not be tempted to return to those policies if the 
long term success of the Community and of its member states is to be achieved. 
Cooperat ion with third countries could be threatened in a recession as well. For this 
reason, free trade agreements will in the long run benefit A N C O M and its members. 
Another key factor is the direct participation of the Presidents in the leadership 
process. "The direct intervention of Presidents in the leadership of the process within the 
new model spurred integration and made it possible to attain the main objectives set by 
the Cartagena Agreement , such as liberalization of trade, adoption of a common external 
tariff, and the harmonization of foreign trade instruments" ("The Andean Community": 
Welcome Page). The continued participation of private enterprise, labor unions, 
indigenous, and other local organizations will likely raise dedication and commitment to 
the Communi ty and its goals. 
A major concern for the Communi ty is the loss of Venezuela and the toll the loss 
will have on the Community. Shortly after the withdrawal of Venezuela from the 
Community, the four remaining member countries expressed their continued commitment 
to the Communi ty in spite of the loss. Unless one of the countries experience a major 
regime change, the likelihood that the Community will dissolve is unlikely. The 
A N C O M countries have felt negative effects because of the loss of Venezuela. In the 
case of Colombia, Venezuela was especially zealous in tearing down former trade links 
that had once been liberalized. In order for Venezuela to rejoin the Andean Community, 
the Venezuelan government will have to return to a market-oriented economic policy. 
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The Andean Community is a model for developing countries that are small or 
med ium sized. The majority of the member countries set political disputes aside in order 
to create a stable environment so economic integration could survive. Combined with 
Mercosur, the Andean Community is the fifth largest free trade zone in the world. It has 
developed institutions and organizations that not only promote economic growth 
throughout the region, but also democracy and social justice. 
55 
REFERENCES 
Adkisson, Richard V. "The Andean Group: Institutional Evolution, Intraregional Trade, 
and Economic Development." Journal of Economic Volume 37 (2003): 371-79. 
Association for Evolutionary Economics. Web. 02 Mar. 2011. 
"Andean Community." Welcome Page. Web. 12 Feb. 2011. 
<http://training.itcilo.it/actrav_cdroml/english/global/blokit/andean.htm>. 
"The Andean Pact: in the Forefront of the Integration Movement | Business America | 
Find Articles at BNET." Find Articles at BNET \ News Articles, Magazine Back 
Issues & Reference Articles on All Topics. Web. 15 Feb. 2011. 
<http://fmdarticles.eom/p/articles/mi_ml 052/is_n5_vl 15/ai_l 6042990/>. 
Angarita, Ciro, and Peter Coffey. Europe and the Andean Countries: a Comparison of 
Economic Policies and Institutions. London: Pinter, 1988. Print. 
Bisley, Nick. Rethinking Globalization. N e w York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Print. 
Bowzas, Roberto. "The 'New Regional ism' and the Negotiation of a Free Trade Area of 
the Americas ." International Negotiation, 2007'. 333-345. Online. 
Bryant, Ralph C. 1987. International Financial Intermediation. Washington D.C: 
Brookings Institution. 
Cho Sang-Wook and Diaz, Julian P . 'The Welfare Impact of Trade 
LihemYizdAion."Economic Inquiry vol 49, 2011. 379-397. Online. 
"CIA - The World Factbook." Welcome to the CIA Web Site — Central Intelligence 
Agency. Web. 05 Feb. 2011. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factb o ok/geo s/pe. html>. 
Crook, Clive. 1992. "A Survey of the World Economy." The Economist, Vol. 324, No. 
7777 (September 19, 1992). 
"Economy - Bolivia - Tax, Import, Export, Average, Growth, Tariff, Annual, Sector." 
Encyclopedia of the Nations - Information about Countries of the World, United 
Nations, and World Leaders. Web. 16 Feb. 2011. 
<http:/ /www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Americas/Bolivia-ECONOMY.html>. 
"Ecuador." U.S. Department of State. Web. 08 Feb. 2011. 
<http://www.state.gOv/r/pa/ei/bgn/35761.htm>. 
Eskridge, William N. , Jr. 1985. "Santa Claus and Sigmund Freud: Structural Contexts of 
the International Debt Problem." A Dance along the Precipice: The Political and 
Economic Dimensions of the International Debt Problem. Edited by William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. Lexington, Ma: Lexington. Pp. 27-102. 
Fontaine, Roger W. The Andean Pact: a Political Analysis. Beverly Hills [Calif.: Sage 
Publications, 1977. Print. 
Fouts, S.C. (1975) "The Andean Foreign Investment Code." Texas International Law 
Journal (Summer): 537-559. 
"Freedom House: Background Reports on Latin America Available." Freedomhouse.org: 
Home. Web. 03 Apr. 2011 . 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release : :=470>. 
"Freedom House: Freedom House Condemns Uprising in Ecuador." Freedomhouse.org: 
Home. Web. 03 Apr. 2011 . 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=1253>. 
57 
"Freedom House: Repeal of Decree Law in Peru A Win for Human Rights." 
Freedomhouse.org: Home. Web. 03 Apr. 2011. 
<http: / /www. freedomhous e. org/template. cfm?page=7 0 &rel ease=1244>. 
Grabowski, Richard. "Latin American and African Economic Development." Asian-
Pacific Economic Literature, vol 24, 2010. 104-116. Online. 
Genest, Marc A. Conflict and Cooperation: Evolving Theories of International Relations. 
Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2004. Print. 
Ghellinck, Elizabeth de. Europe and the Andean Countries: a Comparison of Economic 
Policies and Institutions, pages 57-71. London: Pinter, 1988. Print. 
Hunt, Rebecca K. and Moore, Paul W. "The Andean Pact: In the forefront of the 
integration movement" , Office of Latin America, U.S. Department of 
Commerce. www.tradecompass.com/library/doc/i tbam/05-94ART03.html 
"ICTSD • A N C O M Looks Forward to Free Trade With Panama, Mercosur." ICTSD • 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. Web. 15 Feb. 2011. 
<http://ictsd.Org/i/news/bridgesweekly/92114>. 
International Monetary Fund. "Stabilization and Reform in Latin America: a 
Macroeconomic Perspective on the Experience Since the Early 1990s." 
International Monetary Fund. 01 Feb. 2005. Web. 01 Apr. 2011. 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/238/pdf/op238_7.pdf- 188k - PDF>. 
ISA April 2011 Country Report. Rep. International Strategic Analysis. Web. 01 Apr. 2011 
58 
Krugman, Paul. 1991. "Financial Crisis in the International Economy." The Risk of 
Economic Crisis. Edited by Martin Feldstein. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. Pp. 85-109. 
Lapper, Richard. "Venezuela's Oil-Based Economy." Council on Foreign Relations. Web. 
16 Feb. 2011. <http://www.cfr.org/economics/venezuelas-oil-based-
economy/p l2089>. 
Londono, Gustavo Tobon . Europe and the Andean Countries: a Comparison of 
Economic Policies and Institution, pages 27-41. London: Pinter, 1988. Print. 
"Mercosur, Ancom Create World's Fifth Largest Trade Bloc." The World Trade Review. 
Web. 16 Feb. 2011. 
<http://www.worldtradereview. com/news. asp?pType=N&iType=A&iID=94&siD 
=6&nID=17724>. 
Molano Cruz, Giovanni. "Actores y estructuras de interregionalismo Union E u r o p e a -
Communidad Andina." Revista Mexicana de Sociologia Volume 69 (2007): 571-
603. Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. Web. 02 Mar. 2011. 
Morawetz, David. The Andean Group; a Case Study in Economic Integration among 
Developing Countries. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1974. Print. 
O'Brien, Richard. 1992. Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography. New 
York: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
Ocampo, Jose Antonio. Europe and the Andean Countries: a Comparison of Economic 
Policies and Institution, pages 122-140. London: Pinter, 1988. Print. 
Park, Innwon and Park, Soonchan. "Free Trade Verses Customs Unions: An Examination 
of East Asia ." Asian Economic Papers, vol 8, iss. 2, 2009. 119-139. Online. 
59 
Penaherrera, Germanico Salgado. Europe and the Andean Countries: a Comparison of 
Economic Policies and Institution, pages 173-191. London: Pinter, 1988. Print. 
Puyana, Alicia. Europe and the Andean Countries: a Comparison of Economic Policies 
and Institution, pages 72-87. London: Pinter, 1988. Print. 
Reeve, Trevor A. International Capital Market Integration: Political and Economic Costs 
and Benefits. Thesis. University of Utah, 1993. Web. 
Spero, Joan E. 1888-89. "Guilding Global Finance." Foreign Policy, Vol. 73 (Winter 
1988-89). pp. 114-134. 
"Venezuela and Colombia: Politics versus Trade | The Economist." The Economist -
World News, Politics, Economics, Business & Finance. Web. 10 Feb. 2011. 
<http: / /www. economi st. com/node/14416724>. 
"Venezuela Economy, Venezuela's Economy, Venezuelean Economic Profile | Economy 
Watch." World, US, China, India Economy, Investment, Finance, Credit Cards \ 
Economy Watch. Web. 10 Feb. 2011. 
<http: // www. economywatch. com/ world_economy/venezuel a/>. 
"Venezuela's Oil-dependent Economy: Socialism on the Never-never [ The Economist." 
The Economist - World News, Politics, Economics, Business & Finance. Web. 10 
Feb. 2011. <http:/ /www.economist .com/node/13864830>. 
Wengel, Jan Ter. Allocation of Industry in the Andean Common Market. Boston: M. 
NijhoffPub., 1980. Print. 
"Who Are We?- Andean Communi ty -CAN." Comunidad Andina - Andean Community: 
Organismo De Integracion Econdmica Y Social. Comercio, Relaciones 
Internacionales, Mercado Comun, Normativa,estadisticas, Documentos, Noticias. 
Bolivia , Colombia , Ecuador YPeru. Sudamerica - South America. Web. Dec 
Jan. 2011. <http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/who.htm>. 
Wionczek, Miguel S., "The Rise and the Decline of Latin American Economic 
Integration," Journal of Common Market Studies, IX (September, 1970): 60. 





July 22, 1987 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
2173 Village Point Way 
Sandy, U T 84093 
